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Big Fish, Small Ponds: 
International Crimes in National Courts 
ELIZABETH B. LUDWIN KING* 
The principle of complementarity in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court anticipates that perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity will be tried in domestic courts unless there is no state with 
jurisdiction willing or able to do so. This Article examines the situation where a state 
might be willing to engage in meaningful local justice but temporarily lacks the 
capability to do so due to the effects of the conflict. It argues that where the state 
submits a detailed proposal to the International Criminal Court (ICC) outlining the 
steps necessary to gain or regain the ability to prosecute those most responsible for 
the atrocities within two years, it should be allowed time to do so. The capacity 
building that occurs during this time is vital to promoting and ensuring stability 
throughout the region and beyond, and it will allow the Court to focus its efforts and 
resources on those cases for which there is no other forum. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Countries plagued by conflict involving severe human rights abuses amounting to 
war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity face many challenges once a 
determination is made that the perpetrators will face trial. Chief among these questions 
is where the trials should be located. The International Criminal Court (ICC or 
“Court”), established in 2002, provides a forum for holding the major perpetrators—
the “big fish”1—of these crimes responsible at the international level.2 Its creation 
                                                                                                                 
 
 * Visiting Assistant Professor, Wake Forest University School of Law. I would like to 
thank Cam Flores for his tireless and exceptional research assistance, and Mary-Rose 
Papandrea and Charles Jalloh for their thoughtful suggestions. 
 1. See Payam Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A 
Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 737, 777 (1998); 
Charles Chernor Jalloh, Prosecuting Those Bearing “Greatest Responsibility”: The Lessons 
of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 863, 879 (2013). 
 2. The Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court took effect in 2002 
after enough countries ratified it. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened 
for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter 
Rome Statute]. The Court currently has jurisdiction over genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity. Id. art. 5. The Court will add the crime of aggression in 2017. The Crime of 
Aggression, COALITION FOR INT’L CRIM. CT., www.iccnow.org/?mod=aggression (explaining 
that the International Criminal Court may not act on a crime of aggression until January 2017, 
when States Parties will activate the Court’s jurisdiction). 
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reinforced the notion that these heinous crimes will not go unpunished and that those 
found to have committed them will be held responsible.3 
Yet, not all states want the perpetrators of crimes on their territory to be tried 
elsewhere; some states may prefer domestic prosecutions to international 
proceedings. In the wake of an uprising or war, however, local trials may not be 
possible. Countries may be left without functioning judiciaries, qualified legal 
personnel, or sufficient prison facilities.4 Moreover, those in power may have 
differing opinions about the best path to take, perhaps favoring more restorative 
justice measures as opposed to the retributive nature of trials.5 Still, not all 
postconflict situations are so murky; there are countries that emerge from mass 
atrocities intact enough that domestic trials are viable—if not immediately, then 
within a reasonable period of time.6 
The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) at the ICC has stated that it will encourage 
domestic trials wherever possible.7 Thus, where the state at issue is already 
investigating or prosecuting a matter that has received ICC scrutiny, the Court will 
not intervene, pursuant to the foundational principle of complementarity.8 Thus, if a 
state has jurisdiction and is willing and able to engage in proceedings regarding 
genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity, the ICC will step aside. But what 
of situations where a state desires domestic trials but is temporarily unable to hold 
them due to a lack of infrastructure, qualified personnel, or some other deficiency 
that can be remedied? This Article argues that in this setting, where a state lodges a 
challenge to the admissibility of a matter before the ICC due to its own wish for local 
trials, the Court should delay the admissibility determination for a reasonable period 
of time to allow the state to shore up its judicial system and gain or regain the ability 
to pursue justice within its borders.9 
                                                                                                                 
 
 3. Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl. (“Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern 
to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective 
prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level . . . .”). 
 4. See Mark S. Ellis, The International Criminal Court and Its Implication for Domestic 
Law and National Capacity Building, 15 FLA. J. INT’L L. 215, 239 (2002) (explaining that 
countries in transition confront change in all aspects of government, making it difficult for a 
judiciary to function properly). 
 5. See Jane E. Stromseth, The International Criminal Court and Justice on the Ground, 
43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 427, 428 (2011). 
 6. For example, both Argentina and Iraq prosecuted their own citizens for crimes 
committed during their respective conflicts. See generally CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, RADICAL 
EVIL ON TRIAL (1996); Mark A. Drumbl, The Iraqi High Tribunal and Rule of Law: 
Challenges, 100 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 79, 79 (2006). 
 7. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Court, Statement of the Prosecutor 
to the Diplomatic Corps (Feb. 12, 2004), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres
/0F999F00-A609-4516-A91A-80467BC432D3/143670/LOM_20040212_En.pdf (indicating 
that one of the OTP’s strategic decisions will be to encourage rather than compete with 
national jurisdictions). 
 8. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17 (“[A] case is inadmissible where . . . [t]he case is 
being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it . . . .”). 
 9. It is unlikely that this situation—where a country is able to get its judiciary “up to 
code”—will arise often, but it is important that the Court be active in its approach to 
complementarity in order to facilitate local trials and increase stability and security. 
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By allowing states time to rebuild in order to pursue the perpetrators of the 
atrocities that occurred in their territories, the ICC would be promoting capacity 
building,10 which can be vital following a period of prolonged conflict.11 It follows 
logically that greater capacity can lead to greater stability—locally, regionally, and 
internationally. Moreover, when countries are able to deliver justice and not rely on 
the ICC to do so, the OTP will be able to channel its time and resources toward 
situations where crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction have occurred but where 
domestic prosecution is not possible because there is no other jurisdiction willing 
and able to proceed.12 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Parts I and II address foundational questions: 
What are the differences in the quest for justice at the international and national 
levels, and is one forum preferable in certain circumstances? Furthermore, when 
meting out justice is the goal of a tribunal, why and how should the tribunal take on 
the additional role of capacity builder? Specifically, Part I examines the reasons why 
national courts may be preferred over the ICC—and vice versa.13 Although some 
crimes are so atrocious that their perpetrators receive international attention, it does 
not necessarily follow that they should therefore be tried at the international level. In 
fact, when countries are emerging from conflict, the existence of genuine national 
trials can evidence a commitment to the rule of law that may not have existed 
previously. In the absence of action to implement judicial reforms, a stated dedication 
to judicial reorganization cannot serve as the only reason for keeping trials domestic. 
The ICC contemplates trials occurring at both levels, with the most senior offenders 
facing trial on the international stage and the lower-level offenders coming before 
national courts.14 Yet even high-level defendants should be tried domestically 
whenever possible, even if there is a (reasonable) delay in the ability to bring that 
person before a national tribunal.15 
                                                                                                                 
 
 10. Capacity building, discussed infra Part II, generally refers to “the process through which 
individuals, organizations and societies obtain, strengthen and maintain the capabilities to set and 
achieve their own development objectives over time.” CAPACITY DEV. GRP., UNITED NATIONS 
DEV. PROGRAMME, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: THE UNDP APPROACH TO SUPPORTING 
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT 3 (2009), available at http://www.scor-int.org/SCOR_CB/CB
-Bremen/UNDP_Frequently%20Asked%20Questions%20on%20Capacity%20Development%
20June%202009_with%20bookmarks.pdf [hereinafter U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME]. 
 11. The postconflict rebuilding process increases a state’s capacity through both human 
and physical development. In order to hold trials, for example, there must be courtrooms and 
jail cells and people trained to prosecute, defend, and preside over the proceedings. 
 12. William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal 
Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
53, 73–74 (2008). 
 13. Hybrid courts made up of both national and international personnel still exist, but with 
the establishment of the ICC, the prevailing trend is to direct situations to the OTP. This Article 
focuses on the ICC and national courts and does not discuss hybrids. 
 14. Interestingly, many defendants at the national level would prefer to face prosecution 
at the ICC over their own national courts, for some of the reasons discussed infra Part I. 
 15. Certainly there may also be concerns when the mastermind behind a campaign of terror 
and destruction faces prosecution by a fledgling judicial system, but the positive impact a local 
trial can have on a country grappling with the twin goals of addressing the past and looking 
toward the future may outweigh the defendant’s preference for justice at the international level. 
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Part II focuses on the capacity building that occurs when the ICC delays making 
an admissibility determination in a situation so that a country may develop the 
capability to seek justice domestically. Following a period of conflict, countries can 
be left with a weakened judicial system.16 Governments, nongovernmental 
organizations, the United Nations, and other groups—including the ICC—can play 
a vital role in the reconstruction of a state’s institutions.17 From training judges, 
lawyers, and police officers to amending existing legislation and building 
courthouses and prisons, these groups work together to revitalize the state’s 
mechanisms.18 A purely international tribunal does little to support or ignite domestic 
capacity building directly,19 so it is crucial that trials be at the local level whenever 
possible, even if there is some lag time before the country is prepared. 
Part III parses the principle of complementarity, whereby national courts are 
presumed to be the appropriate venue for trials, unless inability or unwillingness on 
the part of the national governments is an issue. A positive approach to 
complementarity20 by the ICC entails active engagement with countries desiring 
national trials and encourages them to take ownership of the trial process. In contrast, 
a passive approach to complementarity means that the Court distances itself from the 
sovereign affairs of states desiring national trials and gets involved only if there are 
no other options.21 A more practical approach to positive complementarity, whereby 
the ICC encourages national prosecution without substantively or financially 
involving itself in the judicial reforms, better promotes domestic capacity building, 
is a feasible process for the Court, and should be its default position. The 
governments of Kenya and Libya have both lodged complementarity challenges at 
the ICC; their different experiences provide further insight to this fundamental 
                                                                                                                 
 
 16. For example, a scorched-earth campaign carried out by forces sympathetic to 
Indonesia’s desire to annex Timor-Leste left the judicial system in shambles. “Most court 
buildings had been torched and looted, and all court equipment, furniture, registers, records, 
archives, and—indispensable to legal practice—law books, case files, and other legal 
resources dislocated or burned.” Hansjörg Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a 
Judicial System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 
46, 50 (2001). 
 17. See Christian Eric Ford & Ben A. Oppenheim, Neotrusteeship or Mistrusteeship? The 
“Authority Creep” Dilemma in United Nations Transitional Administration, 41 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 55, 90–96 (2008). 
 18. Other capacity-building tasks can include revitalizing the economy and delivering basic 
services, among others. See JONATHAN FRIEDMAN, PRINCETON UNIV., BUILDING CIVIL SERVICE 
CAPACITY: POST-CONFLICT LIBERIA, 2006–2011 (2012), available at http://successfulsocieties
.princeton.edu/sites/successfulsocieties/files/Policy_Note_ID203.pdf. 
 19. It is always possible, however, that ICC indictments might spark reforms on the 
ground in an effort to keep the process local. Christine Bjork & Juanita Goebertus, Note, 
Complementarity in Action: The Role of Civil Society and the ICC in Rule of Law 
Strengthening in Kenya, 14 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 205, 226 (2011) (stating that NGOs 
hoped that ICC intervention, although not directly affecting the capacity-building efforts in 
Kenya, would ignite action on the part of the government). 
 20. See Assembly of States Parties to the Int’l Criminal Court, Report of the Bureau on 
Stocktaking: Complementarity, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/8/51 (Mar. 18, 2010). 
 21. Passive complementarity primarily mollifies the critics’ sovereignty concerns. See 
Carsten Stahn, Complementarity: A Tale of Two Notions, 19 CRIM. L.F. 87, 88 (2008). 
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principle.22 Part III argues that where a country is willing but temporarily unable to 
hold trials, the ICC should grant that country time to be able to prosecute the 
individuals who have been indicted at the Court. Such a policy is faithful to the 
principle of complementarity embodied in the Rome Statute23 and will lead to 
national capacity building. In countries ravaged by conflict, strengthening judicial 
and legislative institutions is essential to increasing stability, as is ensuring the 
existence of adequate infrastructure. 
Part IV suggests a practical approach to a delayed admissibility determination at 
the ICC. A country desiring time to make judicial reforms and gain or regain the 
ability to hold national trials should be required to present a detailed proposal to the 
ICC that includes a timeline and benchmarks for addressing the deficiencies in the 
justice system as well as resource considerations. In these situations, the OTP would 
need to strike a delicate balance between permitting and encouraging national trials 
and setting the stage for impunity to prevail. The Rome Statute already includes 
certain articles providing for oversight by the Court or the OTP,24 which means that the 
Court will be involved at least minimally during this capacity-building process to 
ensure that the country’s efforts are genuine and progressing in a timely fashion. If 
states facing scrutiny from the ICC in the form of investigation or prosecution prefer 
to serve justice within their own borders, they should certainly be able to do this, even 
if there is a reasonable delay while they get their affairs in order. By doing what is 
necessary to make trials possible, these states will benefit greatly from the reforms 
required—legislative, structural, and judicial. 
I. FORUM CHOICE 
When it comes to international crimes, why does the forum matter, as long as the 
alleged perpetrators face trial?25 Even when crimes are committed in such a way that 
they rise to the level of gravity required by the Rome Statute for ICC prosecution,26 
it does not necessarily follow that justice at the international level is the best 
mechanism to address criminal responsibility. Despite the establishment of the ICC 
as a manifestation of the global consensus of the need for international justice, 
accountability at this level does have limitations. Likewise, while national judicial 
systems may sometimes be best positioned to hold trials in the aftermath of conflict, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 22. The ICC has addressed complementarity challenges from individual defendants from 
the Democratic Republic of Congo and Côte d’Ivoire, but this Article is focused on challenges 
by governments. 
 23. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17. 
 24. See id. arts. 18(3), 18(5). 
 25. Professor Jane Stromseth writes that fair and impartial atrocity trials at any level are 
important for the messages they send: that certain conduct is unacceptable and “universally 
condemned”; that trials demonstrate that impunity no longer stands; and that justice can be fair, 
even when the crimes and perpetrators are so horrific. Stromseth, supra note 5, at 432–33. 
 26. Article 17(1)(d) of the Rome Statute requires the ICC to deem a case inadmissible 
when the crimes alleged are not of sufficient gravity. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17(1)(d). 
For information on the gravity standard, see generally Margaret M. deGuzman, The 
International Criminal Court’s Gravity Jurisprudence at Ten, 12 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. 
REV. 475 (2013). 
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they may also face challenges that are not present at the international level. Both 
systems have an interest in bringing the perpetrators to justice, and they can work 
concurrently to achieve this end. The issue of forum choice arises when both the ICC 
and a national government wish to prosecute the offenders most responsible for 
certain crimes.27 When a suspect can be tried at both the international and national 
levels, it is important to analyze the benefits and drawbacks of these systems. 
Where some might argue that a crime so heinous as to fall within the jurisdiction 
of the ICC should be adjudicated there, others may focus instead on the victim 
communities and preference local justice.28 It is crucial to remember that these 
situations are all different; the calculation of advantages and drawbacks of national 
and international tribunals will be unique to every setting.29 There are, however, 
generalizations about forum choice that should be considered when evaluating the 
effectiveness of national and international tribunals, such as efficiency, geography, 
procedural fairness, and capacity building. 
In terms of the efficiency of judicial proceedings, national courts are often the 
better choice as compared to international courts when adjudicating matters that 
occurred on their own territory.30 When the proceedings are local, witnesses and 
evidence are easier and less costly to locate.31 Moreover, there are generally fewer 
enforcement problems at the local level; because the ICC has no police force, it must 
rely on the States Parties to enforce its orders, which does not always occur.32 On the 
other hand, one could argue that from a jurisprudential standpoint the ICC is more 
efficient because it is developing common standards that states can then implement 
themselves, thus increasing uniformity; in contrast, national jurisdictions do not 
                                                                                                                 
 
 27. The OTP has stated that though it might need to prosecute mid- or high-level 
defendants first, its focus is on those perpetrators who bear the greatest responsibility. OFFICE 
OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, STRATEGIC PLAN JUNE 2012–2015, at 14 (2013), 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office
%20of%20the%20prosecutor/policies%20and%20strategies/Documents/OTP-Strategic-Plan
-2012-2015.pdf. 
 28. Elena Baylis, Reassessing the Role of International Criminal Law: Rebuilding 
National Courts Through Transnational Networks, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2009). 
 29. Id. at 13. 
 30. This claim has been echoed by the OTP. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIMINAL 
COURT, PAPER ON SOME POLICY ISSUES BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR 2 (2003), available 
at http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/1fa7c4c6-de5f-42b7-8b25-60aa962ed8b6/143594/030905
_policy_paper.pdf (“National investigations and prosecutions, where they can properly be 
undertaken, will normally be the most effective and efficient means of bringing offenders to justice; 
States themselves will normally have the best access to evidence and witnesses.”). 
 31. Katharine A. Marshall, Prevention and Complementarity in the International 
Criminal Court: A Positive Approach, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Winter 2010, at 21, 24. 
 32. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 59 (“A State Party which has received a request for 
provisional arrest or for arrest and surrender shall immediately take steps to arrest the person 
in question in accordance with its laws and the provisions of Part 9.”). For example, Sudanese 
President Omar al-Bashir has traveled throughout Africa despite the ICC warrant for his arrest 
issued in March 2009. Calls for Arrest of Sudan’s Leader, NEWS.COM.AU (Mar. 5, 2014, 1:55 
PM), http://www.news.com.au/world/breaking-news/calls-for-arrest-of-sudans-leader/story
-e6frfkui-1226845946799. 
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necessarily look to the practice of other states when interpreting the law.33 
Furthermore, the comparable lack of resources at the local level, while not always 
present, can compromise the fair administration of justice.34 
Geography naturally plays a crucial role in the effects of forum choice, and not 
just with regard to approaching witnesses and gathering evidence. National courts 
tend to be geographically closer to the victim populations,35 and thus perhaps better 
suited to assess and respond to their needs. National judiciaries are also accountable 
to the local population at large, whereas international tribunals are accountable to the 
international community that funds them,36 and can give the impression that the 
foreign personnel come in, do the work, and then get out as soon as they can.37 The 
location of national courts can also result in increased media coverage at the local 
level, which does not occur as often when the trials take place on an international 
stage.38 Local media coverage allows the population to be aware of the justice 
initiatives in action, which can result in increased ownership of the accountability 
process.39 Still, an international tribunal may better serve the interests of justice and 
the victim population if that population believes that an international trial is a higher 
form of justice than national prosecution.40 
The issue of procedural fairness can also affect the suitability of a particular court. 
International courts have been described as more impartial than national courts, as 
judges at this level serve in their own capacity and not on behalf of their states.41 
                                                                                                                 
 
 33. See Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Nationalizing International Criminal Law, 41 STAN. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 15–16 (2005). 
 34. Id. at 14. The lack of resources can manifest itself in many ways, such as a lack of qualified 
personnel or infrastructure (including courthouses and prisons). See Cynthia Alkon, The Flawed 
U.S. Approach to Rule of Law Development, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 797, 800 (2013). 
 35. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), however, is located in 
Arusha, Tanzania, much closer to the victim population than its sister tribunal, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), which is located in The Hague. 
 36. José E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 365, 410 (1999). 
 37. Stromseth, supra note 5, at 436 (comparing international and hybrid criminal courts 
to alien spaceships that “arrive, do their business, and take off, leaving a befuddled domestic 
population scratching its head and wondering what, if anything, this has to do with the dire 
realities on the ground”). 
 38. Turner, supra note 33, at 27–28. Consider, for example, the ICTY and ICTR, which 
were not “widely covered in the local media nor as closely followed by the affected local 
populations” as national trials in, for example, Argentina and France. Id. 
 39. Cf. Ivana Nizich, International Tribunals and Their Ability to Provide Adequate 
Justice: Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal, 7 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 353, 362 (2001) 
(pointing out that the people of the former Yugoslavia did not view the ICTY as theirs, but 
rather as a tribunal by and for the international community). 
 40. Richard Goldstone, The United Nations’ War Crimes Tribunals: An Assessment, 12 CONN. 
J. INT’L L. 227, 238 (1997) (explaining that the establishment of the ICTY “created an expectation 
of the highest form of justice—justice to be accomplished through an international institution”). 
 41. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 40 (stating that “judges shall be independent in 
the performance of their functions” to ensure judges serve in their own capacity rather than 
that of their state); Baylis, supra note 28, at 11; see also S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 
(Nov. 8, 1994) (adopting the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda); U.N. 
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security 
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National courts, especially in the aftermath of a divisive conflict, may be subject to 
claims of bias or corruption, thereby erasing any healing effect that the trials may 
otherwise have had.42 International judges, with their distance from the conflict—
both geographical and psychological—may also be more consistent in their 
administration of justice and create a more objective narrative.43 Additionally, the 
ICC offers due process guarantees that may not always be incorporated into the laws 
of a state wishing to try its own alleged criminals,44 leading to a potentially fairer 
outcome by international standards. 
Though there are advantages and disadvantages to atrocity trials at both the 
domestic and international stage, by far the most compelling reason to promote 
national justice is for the potential lasting effects it can have on the local judiciary. 
Trials at the ICC do nothing to strengthen the affected country’s judicial system, and 
a robust legal system can help with stabilization after a period of conflict.45 Just the 
fact of holding trials at all, let alone with the knowledge transfer that comes with 
outside assistance, can affirm the rule of law in an otherwise chaotic society.46 The 
ICC Prosecutor has stated that the OTP “will encourage genuine national 
proceedings where possible,”47 and promoting domestic justice, with the outside 
assistance that often comes with the reformation or fortification of a legal system, 
may leave the country more stable and better positioned to move forward. 
Any state considering the possibility of trials of the orchestrators of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, or war crimes will necessarily weigh its ability to do so 
                                                                                                                 
 
Council Resolution 808 (1993), at 40, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) (containing the 
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia); U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 
2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), S/25704/Add.1 (May 19, 1993); S.C. Res. 827, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (adopting Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to 
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doc. S/25704, supra, and Report of the 
Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. 
Doc. S/25704/Add.1, supra).  At hybrid tribunals such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
which are made up of both international and national judges, the national judges are appointed 
by the government of Sierra Leone, whereas the international judges are appointed by the U.N. 
Secretary-General. U.N. Security Council, Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 
12, Jan. 16, 2002, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3dda29f94.html. 
 42. See Thomas Buergenthal, The United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador, 27 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 497, 503 (1994) (describing how the parties to the peace agreement in 
El Salvador had to look outside the country for truth commissioners because they could not 
“agree on any group of Salvadorans that they would trust to discharge that responsibility”). 
 43. Turner, supra note 33, at 15–16. 
 44. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 67 (affording the accused entitlement “to a public hearing” 
as well as a number of other guarantees); Alejandro Chehtman, Developing Local Capacity for War 
Crimes Trials: Insights from BiH, Sierra Leone, and Colombia, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 297, 301 (2013) 
(citing claims that Rwanda and Sierra Leone, for example, were not able to offer the same kinds of 
due process guarantees that are expected by international standards). 
 45. Baylis, supra note 28, at 84. 
 46. See Turner, supra note 33, at 27–28. 
 47. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY 
2009–2012, at 5 (2010) [hereinafter OTP, PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY]. 
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against ICC involvement. One vital factor in this calculation will likely be the benefit 
to the country of local trials, even those of major perpetrators. From increased public 
confidence in the state to a stronger rule of law, local justice demonstrates to the 
world at large recognition of the horrors that occurred and the ability and 
commitment to address them locally and fairly. If local prosecution of high-level 
perpetrators is not a possibility, however, due to security concerns,48 lack of 
legislation covering the crimes, or other factors, international trials can still offer 
justice to the victims. What is important is that the state has every opportunity to 
keep justice within its borders, even if it takes some extra time. 
II. BUILDING CAPACITY AFTER CONFLICT 
Although justice for victims of atrocity crimes can be found at both the 
international and domestic levels, one key difference is the capacity building that 
takes place when outside actors assist and invest in a country coming out of conflict 
with its justice initiatives. Capacity building, as defined by the U.N. Development 
Programme, is “the process through which individuals, organizations and societies 
obtain, strengthen and maintain the capabilities to set and achieve their own 
development objectives over time.”49 Although capacity building is broad in scope,50 
of relevance here are capacity-building initiatives related to justice and the rule of 
law. These programs, which focus on facilities, judicial training, and legislative 
issues, are but one facet of any thorough capacity-building process, but these 
programs specifically promote stability and predictability.51 Establishing a stable and 
predictable judicial system protects the population “against anarchy as well as from 
arbitrary exercise of power by public officials and allows people to plan their daily 
affairs with confidence.”52 The ICC certainly cannot promote comprehensive 
capacity building, but by allowing countries desiring domestic trials time to build up 
their judiciaries, it can facilitate many key areas. 
Depending on the nature of the conflict, a country emerging from mass atrocity may 
be left with a dearth of infrastructure adequate to pursue the alleged perpetrators of the 
crimes committed. Without prison facilities, courthouses, and police stations, justice 
                                                                                                                 
 
 48. E.g., Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgement, ¶ 10 (May 18, 2012), 
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/1283/SCSL-03-01-T-1283.pdf (explaining 
that Charles Taylor’s trial was held at The Hague in the Netherlands due to concerns about 
regional security). 
 49. U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 10, at 3. 
 50. Other capacity-building initiatives can include, inter alia, recovery after disaster or 
sustainable development. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, ‘CAPACITY IS DEVELOPMENT’: A 
GLOBAL EVENT ON SMART STRATEGIES AND CAPABLE INSTITUTIONS FOR 2015 AND BEYOND 3 (2010). 
 51. See Jeremy M. Wilson, Law and Order in an Emerging Democracy: Lessons from the 
Reconstruction of Kosovo’s Police and Justice Systems, 605 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 
152, 153 (2006) (“[Stability is] the development of a stable environment in which violence-prone 
groups such as insurgents or criminals are subordinated to legitimate governmental authority, 
reintegrated into society, or defeated. A stable government is one in which the population is free 
from major threats to their safety and where national and international actors are able to rebuild 
political, economic, and other key governance institutions.”). 
 52. Id. 
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becomes more difficult to achieve at the domestic level.53 In addition to actual buildings, 
infrastructure deficits can include the lack of appropriate technology, community 
outreach, or even suitable vehicles for transporting prisoners.54 Although the ICC will 
not likely engage directly in this sort of capacity building, by standing aside while a 
country works to develop the necessary facilities, neither will it impede this process. 
In addition to a lack of infrastructure, countries committed to the prosecution of 
individuals accused of war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity require 
personnel—judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys—who know how to run these 
often complex cases.55 
[T]here is specific knowledge applicable to war crimes cases that is 
required both in quite sophisticated legal systems as well as in less 
developed ones. This has to do with the concrete knowledge of the 
relevant rules of international criminal law and international 
humanitarian law, but also more practical areas essential for international 
criminal trials, including court management, case handling, and 
investigation of complex institutional structures and chains of events.56 
To address the knowledge gap, it is common for various actors including bar 
associations and NGOs to offer seminars or other initiatives designed to impart the 
knowledge necessary for the successful administration of justice.57 These programs 
run the gamut from quick one-day courses to longer projects or even secondments. 
For example, the European Union sent two individuals to Colombia to use their 
knowledge of the substantive law and their understanding of the situation on the 
ground to educate magistrates about what course of action to take.58 Because the 
experts stayed with the program for two years, the knowledge transfer was ongoing 
and constant, allowing for a deeper understanding of the intricacies in the relevant 
international laws.59 
Not every country grappling with genocide, war crimes, or crimes against 
humanity has domestic laws covering these acts or procedures in place for complex 
trials, however.60 In some situations, laws must be amended to include certain 
                                                                                                                 
 
 53. There are, of course, plenty of trials that occur in countries lacking comprehensive 
infrastructure, but the existence of actual courtrooms can be an indication of the government’s 
commitment to justice. See, e.g., Lisa Clifford, Open Air Justice in DR Congo, INT’L JUST. TRIB. 
(Neth.), Mar. 16, 2011, at 3 (highlighting the mobile courts in the Democratic Republic of Congo). 
 54. Chehtman, supra note 44, at 302. 
 55. See generally GIDEON BOAS, THE MILOŠEVIĆ TRIAL: LESSONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF 
COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (2007). 
 56. Chehtman, supra note 44, at 302. 
 57. Jeremy Sarkin, Enhancing the Legitimacy, Status, and Role of the International 
Criminal Court Globally by Using Transitional Justice and Restorative Justice Strategies, 6 
INTERDISC. J. HUM. RTS. L. 83, 92 (2012). 
 58. Chehtman, supra note 44, at 305–06. 
 59. See id. 
 60. For example, the Democratic Republic of Congo may only prosecute war crimes and 
crimes against humanity and genocide through a military tribunal, rather than through a 
civilian court. OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, PROMOTING COMPLEMENTARITY IN 
PRACTICE—LESSONS FROM THREE ICC SITUATION COUNTRIES 5 (2010), available at http:// 
2015] INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN NATIONAL COURTS 839 
 
procedural protections; in others, judges and lawyers must use the existing law in 
creative ways so as to avoid claims of nullum crimen sine lege violations.61 For 
example, in Argentina there were no laws criminalizing the act of disappearance—
the abduction (often in broad daylight), imprisonment, torture, and (often) murder by 
the state without acknowledgement—that plagued the Southern Cone in the 1970s 
and 1980s.62 Instead, prosecutors charged defendants with, inter alia, stealing the 
babies born to women who had been “disappeared.”63 In Colombia, where there is 
no domestic law criminalizing crimes against humanity, the Constitutional Court 
stated that it would look to the relevant provisions in the Rome Statute itself because 
of this lacuna.64 Solutions like these can enable countries lacking particular 
legislation to retain jurisdiction, rather than rely solely on the ICC to mete out justice 
for crimes committed within their borders. 
Capacity building after—or sometimes during—conflict is certainly not an easy 
or quick task. Yet, it is imperative that countries whose situations come before the 
ICC and who want to hold domestic trials engage in capacity building rather than sit 
back and allow the Court to proceed because “preventing future atrocities and 
building public confidence in non-violent conflict resolution will depend on the real 
capacity to deliver at least a semblance of fair justice in domestic justice systems.”65 
The danger of failing to promote justice and the rule of law for these countries, 
coupled with the small caseload at the ICC, means that countless perpetrators could 
go unpunished and impunity could prevail.66 
The ICC, of course, can still administer justice by holding the high-level 
perpetrators accountable for crimes that fall within its statutory jurisdiction. When, 
at first blush, it appears that a state is unable to hold trials, the natural response, 
according to the principle of complementarity, would be for the Court to take on the 
cases itself.67 A broad reading of this provision, however, can lead the Court to delay 
its proceedings in order to give the state in question time to shore up its institutions 
and keep justice within its borders. 
                                                                                                                 
 
www.issafrica.org/anicj/uploads/OSJIComplementaritycasestudies.pdf. 
 61. This term of art means that there can be no crime without a law proscribing the 
conduct at issue. See generally Jordan J. Paust, Nullum Crimen and Related Claims, 25 DENV. 
J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 321 (1997). 
 62. Alejandro M. Garro & Henry Dahl, Legal Accountability for Human Rights Violations 
in Argentina: One Step Forward and Two Steps Backward, 8 HUM. RTS. L.J. 283, 319–29 
(1987). See generally ARGENTINE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE DISAPPEARED, NUNCA MÁS: 
THE REPORT OF THE ARGENTINE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE DISAPPEARED (Farrar Straus 
& Giroux 1986) (1984). 
 63. See generally Lisa Avery, A Return to Life: The Right to Identity and the Right to 
Identify Argentina’s “Living Disappeared,” 27 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 235 (2004). 
 64. Chehtman, supra note 44, at 317 (citing the Colombian Constitutional Court case). 
 65. Stromseth, supra note 5, at 436. 
 66. David Tolbert, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: 
Unforeseen Successes and Foreseeable Shortcomings, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Summer/Fall 
2002, at 7, 12 (2002). 
 67. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17. 
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III. APPROACHES TO COMPLEMENTARITY 
Complementarity is one of the bedrock principles of the Rome Statute68: it 
establishes the ICC as a court of last resort, leaving to willing and able national 
jurisdictions the task of prosecuting crimes that fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction.69 
Although “complementarity” is never mentioned outright in the Rome Statute,70 
article 17 codifies this idea, stating that a case that would otherwise be inadmissible 
due to investigation or prosecution on the part of a state may reach the ICC anyway 
if the state is found to be “unwilling or unable genuinely” to investigate or 
prosecute.71 Complementarity thus embeds the notion of deference to national courts 
into the heart of the ICC.72 This preference for adjudication in national courts was 
reinforced by the first Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno-Ocampo; shortly after 
the Court was established, he commented that the marker of the Court’s success would 
not be the number of cases before it, but rather the absence of cases, meaning that when 
national jurisdictions have both the capacity and the willingness to hold trials, the ICC 
may cease to be necessary.73 Indeed, the OTP has indicated that one of its functions is 
to encourage trials at the state level.74 
This focus on national proceedings is necessary, given the ICC’s jurisdictional 
limitation of pursuing accountability only for the “most serious crimes of 
international concern.”75 Additional limitations in terms of resources—both financial 
and human—make it impossible for the OTP to pursue all allegations of war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and genocide.76 Thus, for now at least, the ICC serves an 
essential purpose in the fight against impunity, which means that an in-depth look at 
the complementarity principle—in theory and in practice—can guide the parties 
seeking to determine the best forum for adjudication. An examination of the purpose 
of complementarity and how the principle was borne out in the negotiations indicates 
that the ICC was designed to intervene only in extraordinary situations.77 It is thus 
                                                                                                                 
 
 68. Sharon A. Williams & William A. Schabas, Article 17, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 605, 606 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008). 
 69. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17. 
 70. Article 1 mentions that the Court “shall be complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions,” but “complementarity” is absent from the Statute. Id. art. 1. 
 71. Id. art. 17(1)(a). It is worth noting, however, that it is the ICC that makes the 
determination of unwillingness or inability. Id. art. 17(2)–(3) (listing the factors that the Court 
will consider in order to determine unwillingness or inability). 
 72. Baylis, supra note 28, at 3; see also Turner, supra note 33, at 6 (pointing out that the 
concept of complementarity is so fundamental to the Rome Statute that it is referenced three 
times: in the preamble, article 1, and article 17). 
 73. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER: THE 
PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY IN PRACTICE 3 (2003) [hereinafter COMPLEMENTARITY IN 
PRACTICE]. 
 74. Id. at 4 (“A major goal of the Prosecutor . . . [is] motivating genuine national 
proceedings on the basis of effective legislation.”). 
 75. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 1. 
 76. Phil Clark, Law, Politics and Pragmatism: The ICC and Case Selection in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda, in COURTING CONFLICT? JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE 
ICC IN AFRICA 37, 37 (Nicholas Waddell & Phil Clark eds., 2008). 
 77. Turner, supra note 33, at 6–7. 
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necessary to examine competing approaches to complementarity—both passive and 
positive. Moreover, because complementarity is an admissibility determination, the 
criteria for admissibility, especially those relating to the ability of governments to 
hold national trials, must be considered. Finally, the Court and the OTP have 
previously been engaged in complementarity negotiations with the governments of 
Kenya and Libya.78 These examples provide insight into the OTP’s approach. 
During the Rome Statute drafting negotiations, many states were concerned about 
a strong international court wielding too much power.79 These states were hesitant to 
give up so much control to an untested international body.80 Because such a court 
would necessarily impinge on states’ sovereignty, the reluctant states wanted 
assurances that the court would be a last resort, supplementing already existing 
domestic judicial systems.81 As a result of these discussions, the Rome Statute 
provides that the primary responsibility for preventing and punishing crimes under 
the Statute’s jurisdiction lies with the states.82 The ICC will only step in when states 
with jurisdiction do not engage in genuine investigations or prosecutions.83 The OTP 
implements the principle of complementarity in two ways: through an admissibility 
determination that asks whether any investigation or prosecution is genuine, and by 
promoting and facilitating national prosecutions.84 These two facets of 
complementarity are sometimes referred to as passive complementarity and positive 
complementarity.85 
Passive complementarity represents the idea of the ICC as a court of last resort, 
intervening only when there is a failure to do so on the part of a state with 
jurisdiction.86 In this sense the Court functions as a way to motivate states to take 
action: if the state acts, then the ICC sits back and watches, but if the state does 
nothing, then the Court becomes involved.87 Positive complementarity, by contrast, 
means that the ICC takes a more active role in enabling states to carry out 
prosecutions on their own.88 In regard to positive complementarity, the emphasis is 
on supporting these states as they build up their judiciaries.89 The OTP has 
                                                                                                                 
 
 78. See generally COALITION FOR INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.iccnow.org (providing 
information on the admissibility of the Kenyan and Libyan cases). 
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 80. See Turner, supra note 33, at 5. 
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 83. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17(1)(a)–(b). 
 84. OTP, PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY, supra note 47, at 4–5. 
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12, at 55–56. 
 89. Marshall, supra note 31, at 21–22. 
842 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 90:829 
 
commented on this positive approach to complementarity, noting that it will 
encourage national proceedings, though not in ways that involve financial assistance 
or direct capacity building.90 Clearly, interpreting the principle of complementarity 
in a positive way is consistent with the notion that national courts should take the 
lead in investigating and prosecuting alleged perpetrators of serious international 
crimes when possible.91 
Complementarity becomes an issue when a state challenges the admissibility of a 
situation or case before the ICC.92 Because it is assumed that cases are admissible by 
the time they make it to the ICC,93 the Rome Statute sets out only the reasons that a 
case or situation would be inadmissible, including where a case is not “of sufficient 
gravity” or where double jeopardy is an issue.94 Of particular relevance here, 
however, are the provisions of article 17 that address a state’s unwillingness or 
inability to investigate or prosecute an individual accused of committing one of the 
crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction.95 Article 17(1) renders a case inadmissible 
where a state has already investigated and prosecuted a case or has investigated a case 
                                                                                                                 
 
 90. OTP, PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY, supra note 47, at 5 (stating that the OTP’s positive 
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 95. Id. art. 17(1)–(3). 
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and decided not to go forward with prosecution unless these decisions “resulted from 
the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely” to carry out these proceedings.96 
The ICC Appeals Chamber has held that an article 17 admissibility analysis should 
proceed in two steps: first, an examination of whether the state has taken any action 
toward investigation or prosecution, and second, an examination of whether a state that 
is taking action is willing and able to do so genuinely.97 
With regard to willingness, the Rome Statute mentions three factors weighing 
toward a finding that a state is acting in a manner that calls into question its genuine 
willingness to hold individuals accountable: where the national proceedings are 
being undertaken to protect the person from criminal responsibility,98 where there is 
an undue delay in the proceedings,99 or where the proceedings lack impartiality or 
independence.100 Unwillingness evaluations have the potential to be complicated, 
considering that officials are essentially accused of nefarious behavior and the state’s 
motives are called into question.101 
The inability prong, by contrast, is at first blush quite simple: a state will be found to 
be unable to carry out genuine proceedings when its judicial system has substantially or 
totally collapsed or is otherwise unavailable, when the state cannot access evidence or 
gain custody over the accused, or when it is otherwise unable to carry out genuine 
proceedings.102 Willingness does not factor into this assessment; it is purely an analysis 
of a state’s capacity to engage in a genuine investigation and prosecution.103 
The OTP has provided several factors that are relevant to an inability evaluation 
centered on the collapse or unavailability of the judiciary. These include “lack of 
necessary personnel, judges, investigators, prosecutor; lack of judicial infrastructure; 
lack of substantive or procedural penal legislation rendering system ‘unavailable’; 
lack of access rendering system ‘unavailable’; obstruction by uncontrolled elements 
rendering system ‘unavailable’; [and] amnesties, immunities rendering system 
‘unavailable’.”104 
Notably, these factors are fairly structural and focus on a state’s capacity to hold 
trials in terms of human resources, infrastructure, accessibility, and legislation. The 
inability assessment does not explicitly consider how guarantees such as fairness and 
due process affect the analysis, though article 17(3)’s catchall provision, “or 
otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings,” may be an avenue for arguing that a 
lack of basic judicial protections renders a national judicial system unable genuinely 
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to engage in proceedings.105 Indeed, the OTP has stated that, as it is not a human 
rights monitoring institution, the bar for a finding of inability on behalf of a state is 
high.106 Thus, it is possible that a state may be found to be able genuinely to 
investigate and/or prosecute even where it is not in compliance with international 
standards of justice and fairness. It follows then that it would not be impossible for a 
state suffering the aftereffects of conflict to go from not being able to hold genuine 
proceedings to being able to do so in a relatively short period of time, especially with 
outside assistance. 
In such a situation, where a country is able to gain or regain the ability to prosecute 
the same individuals who have been investigated by the ICC, it should be permitted 
and encouraged to do so. The period during which it shores up its judicial system 
will be a period of capacity building that will provide benefits long after the trials are 
over. Moreover, permitting a delay at the ICC to allow a state to strengthen the 
institutions necessary in order to deliver justice stays true to the concept of 
complementarity, which provides that the ICC will get involved in a matter only if 
there is no other available jurisdiction that is willing and able to undertake genuine 
investigations and prosecutions.107 
Where a state is willing but unable, “the principle of complementarity argues in 
favor of offering international support for domestic prosecutions,” though the ICC, 
being a young institution, may prefer to retain jurisdiction and “establish[ ] its own 
credibility.”108 Although the OTP has stated that it will not engage financially with 
domestic jurisdictions,109 allowing those states time to find other groups that will 
engage with them on different levels—financially, legislatively, structurally, etc.—
will enable states to pursue domestic accountability and leave the Court’s time and 
resources for the cases that have no other viable forum. 
Two instances in which governments have raised admissibility claims based on 
complementarity are the situations involving Kenya and Libya.110 Postelection 
violence along ethnic lines in 2007 brought Kenya to the attention of the ICC 
Prosecutor in 2008.111 Initially, the Kenyan government wanted to take control of 
accountability measures, and the Prosecutor and Kenyan officials worked together to 
come up with a plan for domestic investigations and prosecutions, as well as a 
timeline for implementation.112 When Kenya failed to meet the benchmarks set out 
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in the timeline, the ICC Prosecutor used her propio motu powers for the first time to 
continue with her investigations and prosecutions.113 
As in Kenya, the Libyan government wanted to keep justice local. After the fall 
of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, the U.N. Security Council referred the situation in 
Libya to the OTP, which indicted Muammar Mohamed Abu Minyar Gaddafi; his 
son, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi; and Abdullah Al-Senussi.114 Libya, however, preferred 
that Saif Gaddafi and Al-Senussi face prosecution at home,115 stating that domestic 
justice can be “a foundation for reconciliation, democracy and rule of law.”116 The 
Court ruled separately for each defendant, finding that Libya was unable to try 
Gaddafi due to security considerations, but that the OTP’s case against Al-Senussi 
was inadmissible because Libyan authorities were willing and able to undertake the 
prosecution.117 In July 2014, the Appeals Chamber confirmed this ruling, stating that 
Al-Senussi could be tried at home, despite claims by human rights groups that Al-
Senussi cannot receive a fair trial in Libya.118 
In both situations, the ICC’s approach to domestic versus international justice was 
rather passive.119 It is promising, however, that the Court made individualized 
determinations in the Libya cases rather than a blanket statement about the country’s 
willingness or ability to serve justice within its borders.120 Still, a better approach to 
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-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/pr911.aspx. 
 118. Libya: ICC Judges Reject Sanussi Appeal, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 24, 2014), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/24/libya-icc-judges-reject-sanussi-appeal. 
 119. Harry Orr Hobbs highlights a disconnect between the OTP, which seems willing to 
work with local jurisdictions to enable domestic trials, and the chambers, which take a more 
black-and-white approach to complementarity. Harry Orr Hobbs, The Security Council and 
the Complementary Regime of the International Criminal Court: Lessons from Libya, 9 EYES 
ON ICC 19 (2013). 
 120. See Al-Senussi Press Release, supra note 117; Gaddafi Press Release, supra note 117. 
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complementarity would dig deeper to try to identify relevant deficits and remedies to 
enable local prosecutions. The government must obviously also play an active role if it 
wishes to retain jurisdiction. A prosecutorial plan from the state designed to be 
implemented in domestic courts satisfies the ICC’s goal of preventing impunity while 
also giving the affected state time to rebuild its judicial structure. 
IV. WORKING TOGETHER TO ENABLE LOCAL TRIALS 
If a country coming under the watchful eye of the ICC prefers to retain jurisdiction 
and hold alleged perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide 
responsible on a domestic level, the ICC must determine whether genuine national 
trials are possible. Of relevance here are the situations where a country is unable to 
engage in meaningful local justice at the time the ICC shines a spotlight on it, but 
could gain the ability to conduct trials in a relatively short period. In order for the 
ICC to agree to a deferred admissibility determination, however, the country at issue 
must submit a comprehensive proposal with a timeline, achieve its goals within a 
two-year period, and consent to oversight by the OTP. 
The request for an extension in order to gain or regain the ability to undertake 
local justice must include a detailed plan outlining what exactly needs to occur in 
order for the country to hold local trials successfully. This requirement will serve as 
a filter to ensure that only countries that are serious about reforming or restoring their 
judicial systems are using the Court’s limited time and resources with such a request. 
The state will assess its current condition and address any problematic structural, 
legislative, or judicial conditions that make the prosecution of alleged perpetrators 
of crimes against humanity, genocide, or war crimes difficult. 
Is there a prison secure enough to hold high-level and well-connected officials?121 
Is there existing legislation covering the same actions the OTP is investigating?122 
Are there judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys who are familiar with 
prosecuting these crimes? Are there investigators and forensics specialists who know 
how to approach these often complex cases?123 If the state is lacking in any of these 
areas it must indicate how it intends to remedy the deficit. To the extent that a state 
intends to seek outside assistance, it must identify what kind of help it needs and 
from whom. States, NGOs, and other groups have knowledge, expertise, and 
resources to bring to bear on the situation. They also have an interest in facilitating 
local justice for the stability it brings to the state and beyond. Any kind of change or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 121. For example, due to security concerns, Charles Taylor, who was prosecuted before 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone, was put on trial in The Hague instead of in Sierra Leone. 
Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgement, ¶ 10 (May 18, 2012), 
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/1283/SCSL-03-01-T-1283.pdf. 
 122. The Court has followed the “same person/same conduct” rule and asks whether the 
individual being investigated at the domestic level is the same as the person being investigated 
at the international level and if the underlying conduct is the same. Claire Grandison, ICC 
Appeals Chamber Confirms the Admissibility of Cases in the Situation of Kenya, HUM. RTS. 
BRIEF, Fall 2011, at 36, 37. 
 123. For example, the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team is a well-known NGO that 
operates in countries around the world to assist in the exhumation of mass graves. See 
generally ARGENTINE FORENSIC ANTHROPOLOGY TEAM, http://www.eaaf.org. 
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development, of course, requires resources, and thus the state also needs details 
regarding how it will turn its reformative ideas into reality.124 Certainly a state that 
must address significant deficits in all three of these areas will be less likely to present 
a sufficient proposal to the ICC, but a country that lacks particular skills, structures, 
or laws but can remedy these deficiencies relatively quickly would benefit from 
keeping justice local. 
Another constraint, beyond the detailed nature of the proposal, is the two-year 
time frame for completion. This deadline is long enough that changes can be made, 
but not so long that both defendants and victims suffer disproportionately. A 
government that is serious about strengthening its judiciary will present the ICC with 
a plan that can be achieved within the two-year deadline. A chief concern, naturally, 
regards the fate of any defendants during this time.125 Though there is no good 
solution, it is worth pointing out that justice at the international level is slow: Thomas 
Lubanga from the Democratic Republic of Congo spent nearly three years in custody 
at the ICC before his trial began,126 while fellow countrymen Germain Katanga and 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui were in pretrial detention for roughly two years each.127 
Moreover, all of these trials lasted over five years, during which time the defendants 
were in custody. Domestic justice is generally thought to be swifter than international 
justice,128 and the idea is that the two-year period proposed here is designed to give 
the state an opportunity to make real improvements to its justice system without 
compromising the rights of the victims or defendants. 
The process does not end once the proposal is submitted to and accepted by the 
Court; rather, the OTP should take on a supervisory role at this point, ensuring that 
the country is meeting its goals and making progress toward holding trials. The Rome 
Statute already contains language facilitating this function.129 Article 18(5) permits 
the Prosecutor, having deferred investigation, to request periodic updates on a state’s 
efforts to hold the perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide 
responsible domestically.130 Moreover, article 18(3) allows the Prosecutor to review 
a decision to defer prosecution every six months “or at any time when there has been 
                                                                                                                 
 
 124. There may be an opportunity for corporations to fund projects, in addition to NGOs 
and other groups. 
 125. See Caroline Davidson, May It Please the Crowd? The Role of Public Confidence, 
Public Order, and Public Opinion in Bail for International Criminal Defendants, 43 COLUM. 
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 128. See supra Part I. 
 129. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 18(3), (5). 
 130. Id. art. 18(5) (“When the Prosecutor has deferred an investigation . . . , the Prosecutor 
may request that the State concerned periodically inform the Prosecutor of the progress of its 
investigations and any subsequent prosecutions. States Parties shall respond to such requests 
without undue delay.”). 
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a significant change of circumstances based on the State’s unwillingness or inability 
genuinely to carry out the investigation.”131 If the state is unable to reach its goals, 
the Prosecutor will have the option of reasserting jurisdiction; this possibility 
naturally increases the likelihood that the state will make judicial reform a priority 
within its larger agenda. Thus the statute itself anticipates regular contact between 
states and the OTP; applying this scheme to situations where an admissibility 
determination is delayed pending progress toward judicial capability is a logical use 
of existing tools. 
 This process whereby states submit proposals and the OTP retains oversight with 
regard to their progress can enable states to adjudicate cases of the perpetrators of 
heinous crimes at all levels. By having to create a detailed proposal and then meet 
the goals therein under the watchful eye of the Court, only states committed to local 
justice will undertake this task. The Rome Statute contains the tools necessary for 
this process to succeed, and where the Court oversees work between states, NGOs, 
and other organizations dedicated to the rule of law, the state’s institutions will be 
strengthened and all those affected by the conflict will benefit from the state’s 
increased stability. 
CONCLUSION 
The principle of complementarity, one of the foundational concepts of the Rome 
Statute that created the ICC, dictates that individuals whose actions bring them 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC are to be tried at the national level unless a state 
with jurisdiction is “unwilling or unable” to carry out genuine investigations and 
prosecutions.132 The Court, then, is one of last resort, stepping in only when there is 
no other option, so as to prevent impunity from prevailing. The availability of a 
national jurisdiction in which to hold a trial hinges on this willingness or ability. 
Where there is willingness on the part of a state with jurisdiction but not the ability 
to mete out justice due to the effects of the conflict, it is in both the state’s and the 
ICC’s interests for the Court to grant the state a limited amount of time to shore up 
its judicial system in order to gain or regain the ability to hold trials. Encouraging 
states to hold their own trials builds national capacity, which can lead to greater 
national, regional, and, ultimately, international stability.133 
Though complementarity contemplates that trials will occur at the national level 
whenever possible, it does not necessarily follow that national trials are always the 
best choice. There are benefits and drawbacks to trials at both levels, but because of 
the capacity building that occurs when trials are held locally, when possible the ICC 
should facilitate domestic prosecution. This approach to complementarity, in which 
the Court fosters national trials without active involvement, represents a feasible way 
for the ICC to interact in a positive manner with states and promote capacity growth. 
The Court should delay admissibility decisions based on inability in order to allow 
the state at issue time to gain the ability to prosecute the individuals who have been 
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indicted by the ICC. The capacity building that occurs during this process will have 
positive repercussions beyond the country’s borders. 
Of course, this policy of allowing states the opportunity to strengthen their judicial 
systems cannot exist without parameters. States wishing to use their own judiciaries 
to seek justice following atrocity must submit a detailed proposal to the ICC that 
includes a timeline with benchmarks setting out exactly how and when it intends to 
address the deficiencies in its justice system and how these reforms will be funded. 
Moreover, any such plan must be implemented within two years, lest a state use this 
process to thwart proceedings at the ICC. Finally, the Court may reinstate 
proceedings in the event that a state fails to meet its deadlines; this process is intended 
to allow states to benefit from the capacity building that will occur during judicial 
reform, but not when it results in an unjustified delay that affects both the defendants 
and the victims. 
  
